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ASSURING THE FLOW: MARITIME SECURITY
CHALLENGES AND TRADE BETWEEN THE U.S.
AND CHINA
Joshua A. Lindenbaum
I. INTRODUCTION
Perhaps no economic issue looms larger on the agenda of world
governments and business leaders than the emergence of China and
its economy. In 2005, China's economy, expressed in terms of Gross
Domestic Product (GDP), was estimated to be $8.158 trillion.' This
ranks third among world economies, behind only the United States
and the European Union. 2 Though the implications of China's ascen-
dance impact the entire world, the effect on the U.S. and its evolving
economic relationship with China is particularly acute, as U.S. busi-
nesses seek new opportunities for economic development there at an
increasing pace.3 The magnitude of the economic relationship between
China and the U.S. manifests itself in several ways, most notably in
the amount of trade between the countries, estimated in 2004 to be
some $231.4 billion.4
The economic relationship between the two countries is charac-
terized by significant, ever-increasing U.S. dependence on Chinese im-
ports.5 This rise in imports is attributable to increased production of
consumer goods by Chinese companies, the outsource of manufactur-
ing by U.S. companies to China, and the subsequent shipping of fin-
ished product back to the U.S.6 Given the massive scale of these
activities, the shipping industry plays a particularly crucial role in fa-
cilitating U.S.-Sino trade: moving goods and materials safely and effi-
ciently between the two countries.
1 CIA World Factbook, "Purchasing Power Parity" chart, at http://www.cia.gov/cia/
publications/factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2006).
2 Id.
3 See e.g., Seminar, Sino-U.S. Relations in the 21st Century, 6 J. INT'L L. & PRAc.
229 (1997).
4 See Foreign Trade Statistics- Trade in Goods (Imports, Exports, and Trade Bal-
ance) with China, U.S. Census Bureau, available at httpJ/www.census.gov/for-
eign-trade/balance/c5700.html.
5 ODED SHENKAR, THE CHINESE CENTURY: THE RISING CHINESE ECONOMY AND ITS
IMPACT ON THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, THE BALANCE OF POWER, AND YOUR JOB (Whar-
ton School Publishing 1st. ed. 2005).
6 See John S. McClenahen, U.S.-China Trade: A Different View, INDUSTRYWEEK.
COM, May 24, 2005, available at http://www.industryweek.com/ReadArticle.aspx?
ArticlelD=10322 (last visited Feb. 15, 2006).
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Among the myriad factors affecting the global shipping indus-
try, two events of the early twenty-first century stand out as the most
significant: the terrorist attacks on September 11, 20017 and exactly
three months later, the entry of China into the World Trade Organiza-
tion.' What is particularly remarkable about these events is their syn-
ergy in creating challenges for the world's shipping industry,
governments, and businesses. The 9/11 attacks exposed shortcomings
in virtually every facet of U.S. homeland security. The methods used
by the terrorists responsible for the 9/11 attacks initially directed at-
tention toward the aviation industry. Soon after, focus broadened to
include the vulnerabilities of the shipping industry, American sea-
ports, and, thereby, those of any country that transports goods to or
from the U.S.9 These vulnerabilities, combined with the rapid growth
of China's foreign trade, 1 0-attributable in part to its recent WTO
membership and the resulting increase in the volume of goods being
shipped,-made increasing worldwide port security imperative.1 1
Achieving the maritime security necessary to assure sustained
growth in trade between the U.S. and China presents a unique set of
challenges. This article addresses some of these challenges and as-
sesses the costs to the governments and businesses that seek to over-
come them. Part II begins with an overview of maritime security
measures and policies implemented by the U.S. government in the
wake of the 9/11 attacks and specifically examines the Container Se-
curity Initiative (CSI), a proactive security program implemented by
the United States Customs Service. Part III of the article examines
international efforts to secure maritime transport, the cooperation
these policies require, and attendant legal issues. Part IV concludes
7 See e.g., Symposium, Admiralty Law Institute Symposium, Confused Seas: Ad-
miralty Law in the Wake of Terrorism, Thomas J. Schoenbaum & Jessica C. Lang-
ston, An All Hands Evolution: Port Security in the Wake of September 11th, 77
TuL. L. REV. 1333 (2003).
8 See e.g., Jin Cheng, Kevin Cullinane, Kevin X. Li, and Hong Yan, Maritime Pol-
icy in China After WTO: Impacts and Implications for Foreign Investment, 36 J.
MAR. L. & COM. 77 (2005); see also, UNDERSTANDING THE WTO: THE ORGAN-
IZATION, Members and Observers, at httpJ/www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/
whatis_e/tife/org6_e.htm (last updated Dec. 11, 2005) (China was officially admit-
ted into the World Trade Organization on December 11, 2001).
9 See e.g., Sung Y. Lee, The Container Security Initiative: Balancing U.S. Security
Interests with the European Union's Legal and Economic Concerns, 13 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 123 (2004).
10 See Richard N. Haass, Speech to the National Committee on U.S.-China Rela-
tions, New York, N.Y., (December 5, 2002) (transcript available at http://
www.ncuscr.org/articlesandspeeches/haass-speech.htm) (last visited Feb. 15,
2006).
11 See e.g., Owen Bishop, A "Secure" Package? Maritime Cargo Container Security
After 9/11, 29 TRANsP. L. J. 313 (2002).
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with an exploration of the burdens and opportunities these issues cre-
ate for businesses and the governments of the United States and
China, in the context of today's realities.
II. SECURING UNITED STATES PORTS AND MARITIME
CARGO: POLICY AND TECHNOLOGY
Both the legislative and executive branches of the U.S. govern-
ment have responded to the issue of port security. This response has
manifested in a variety of legislation, government programs and ad-
justments in the deployment of various military and security assets.
In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Bush Administra-
tion and the United States Congress recognized a need to better coor-
dinate the numerous entities involved in providing domestic security.
President Bush created an Executive Office of Homeland Security,
charging it with managing resources and implementing programs to
protect the U.S. against future terrorist threats.' 2 Shortly thereafter,
having identified the nation's ports as a likely target of attack,' 3 Con-
gress passed the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002
(MTSA), as an amendment to the Merchant Marine Act of 1936.14 The
MTSA supplies agencies beneath the umbrella of the Office of Home-
land Security with the authority to provide security for the nation's
ports and cargo containers.' 5
The MTSA marked the first time the U.S. Congress passed new
maritime legislation addressing port security in some sixteen years. 16
Though it ostensibly addressed port security, the International Mari-
time and Port Security Act, passed in 1986 as a reaction to the Achille
Lauro incident, was primarily concerned with security on cruise ships
and other passenger vessels.'" The MTSA focused on cargo, and
placed much of the responsibility for port security on the United States
12 Id.
13 See Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116
Stat. 2064, 2067 (2002) (amending Title 46 of the United States Code to incorpo-
rate port security initiatives).
14 Id. at 2064.
15 See Terence F. Hoverter, Comment- Containing Marine Terrorism: Federal Ini-
tiatives Post 9/11, 16 U.S.F. MAR. L. J. 353, 357 (2004).
16 Symposium, Admiralty Law Institute Symposium, Confused Seas: Admiralty
Law in the Wake of Terrorism, Robert G. Clyne, Terrorism and Port/ Cargo Secur-
ity: Developments and Implications for Marine Cargo Recoveries, 77 TUL. L. REv.
1183, 1189 (2003) (stating that although President Clinton created the Inter-
agency Commission on Crime and Security in United States Ports via Executive
Order in 1999, the last maritime security legislation passed by the U.S Congress
was the International Maritime and Port Security Act of 1986).
17 Id.
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Coast Guard, increasing its budget and authority."8 The Coast Guard
now serves a unique role in the nation's military-security complex; not
only it is one of the fives branches of the military during times of war,
but it is also a prominent agency within the Department of Homeland
Security.' 9 The formidability of the Coast Guard's task is borne out by
the numbers: 26,000 seagoing cargo containers arrive in the ports of
the U.S. each day; in 2004 this totaled an estimated 9.6 million con-
tainers.20 These cargo containers are unloaded in 361 different U.S.
ports.2 ' Moreover, the cargo arrives on some 46,000 ships operating
among the world's 3,000 ports.2 2
Each cargo container can be said to represent a terrorist threat
within itself, as a bomb concealed among cargo is a likely means of
carrying out an attack on a commercial seaport. The results of the
successful execution of such an attack are difficult to calculate. But in
attempting to do so, one must look beyond immediate, local effects; i.e.,
loss of life, destruction of property, and physical damage to the struc-
ture and facilities of the targeted port. Following a successful terrorist
attack on a single American port, it is likely that all U.S. ports would
effectively shut down for an indefinite period of time. Such a shut
down would have a ripple effect around the globe. It follows logically
that the negative impact on world trade would be severe, with losses
easily reaching into the billions of dollars.2 3
Given the scale and scope of the task of securing U.S. ports,
government security officials and shipping industry leaders recognized
the need for new technology and increased international cooperation.
The international community followed the United States' lead in re-
vamping its maritime security policies. In December 2002, the Inter-
national Maritime Organization (IMO) passed amendments to the
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, (SOLAS) ad-
dressing the need for enhanced ports and cargo ship security.24 At the
18 See Frank A. LoBiondo, Improved Port Security Technology: Vital for Safe and
Secure Waterways, 111105 SEA TECH.,at 39, available at 2005 WLNR 1575471.19 E.g., Symposium, Combating Terrorism in the Environmental Trenches: Re-
sponding to Terrorism, James Corbett & Jeremy Firestone, Maritime Transporta-
tion: A Third Way for Port and Environmental Security, 9 WIDENER L. SyMP. J.
419, 423 (2003).
20 Port Security Issues Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Trans-
portation, May 17, 2005 (statement of Robert Jacksta, Executive Director, Depart-
ment of Homeland Security), available at 2005 WLNR 7787128.
21 See LoBiondo supra note 18, at 39.
22 Tim Weiner, U.S. Law Puts World Ports on Notice, N.Y. TiMEs, March 24, 2004,
at A6.
23 Id.
24 Sean D. Murphy, Establishment of U.S. Antiterrorism Maritime Transportation
System, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 588, 589 (2004).
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same time, the Coast Guard and the Customs and Border Protection
agency (CBP) looked to the international community, creating a piv-
otal role for foreign governments. One such program is the Container
Security Initiative (CSI), predicated on the idea that the U.S. should
expand its security measures outward in an effort to make American
borders the absolute last line of defense.2" The CSI has four main fac-
ets: (1) the use of intelligence and technology to identify and evaluate
risk of terrorism in individual shipments, (2) the pre-screening of
cargo containers in their originating ports, (3) the use of technology to
do this screening expediently, and (4) a move toward the use of cargo
containers that are less-susceptible to tampering than those commonly
in use at present.26
To accomplish the primary objective of the CSI, the pre-screen-
ing of containers, U.S. Customs has entered into bilateral agreements
with foreign governments that grant Customs agents access to foreign
ports. While U.S. agents are precluded from conducting security opera-
tions themselves, they actively coordinate efforts with local security
officials to screen containers. 27 The CSI initially focused on the top
twenty so-called "megaports." These are foreign ports responsible for
the greatest percentage of exports to the United States. Phase II of the
CSI is currently expanding the program to ports beyond the top twenty
megaports. 28 Thus far, the U.S. has implemented the CSI in thirty-
three ports in nineteen countries, 29 including China-controlled Hong
Kong and Shanghai, which rank as the first and second largest foreign
ports, respectively, in terms of exports to the U.S.3 °
Since the 9/11 attacks, China has generally been supportive to-
ward U.S. efforts to combat terrorism, and Chinese involvement in the
CSI is a notable example given the level of cooperation it requires. But
this cooperation serves China's interests as well; it advances Chinese
efforts to further ingratiate itself to the international community.
Moreover, it supports growth of their economy, which depends upon
25 E.g., United States Customs and Border Protection, CSI in Brief, available at
http://www.customs.gov/xp/cgov/border-security/internationalactivities/csi/
csi in brief.xml (2005)(last visited Feb. 15, 2006).
26 Id.
27 See, e.g., Lee supra note 9, at 123.
28 United States Consulate, Hong Kong, U.S. Works on Container Security in For-
eign Ports, Fact Sheet: Container Security Initiative Guards America, Global Com-
merce From Terrorist Threat, available at http://hongkong.usconsulate.gov/ushk/
others/2003/031201.htm (Mar. 12, 2003)(last visited Feb. 15, 2006).
29 See United States Customs and Border Protection, Ports in CSI- Currently Op-
erational Ports, available at http://www.customs.gov/xp/cgov/border security/in-
ternational-activities/csi/ports in csi.xml.
30 United States Consulate, Hong Kong supra note 28, at 2.
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the ability to ship Chinese goods throughout the world. Port security
is an essential element of this ability.3 1
While the intelligence and manpower necessary for the imple-
mentation of the CSI are supplied by the U.S. and cooperative foreign
governments, it is technology that actually detects threats within ship-
ping containers. In evaluating terrorist threats, a primary area of con-
cern is a bomb attack on a port, especially one carried out with a
nuclear device or radiological bomb. 32 As such, non-intrusive inspec-
tion equipment with the capability to detect radiation is required to
effectively screen the standard shipping container. The acquisition of
such equipment is one of the requirements for a port to be eligible for
participation in the CSI.3 3 Technology is also crucial to the adminis-
trative and communication components of port security operations.3 4
Prior to 9/11, ports were the frontline of the War on Drugs, not the
War on Terrorism. As a result, much of the security technology used by
ports and the Coast Guard focused on the detection of illegal drugs.35
Technology companies and the military industrial complex rapidly ex-
panded and tailored their research and development efforts, advancing
existing research with computers and satellites to develop applications
for port security. 36 The military-industrial complex's history of rapid
response to the security needs of the U.S. indicates that effective tech-
nologies to secure the world's ships and ports will be developed. The
question is: who will bear the substantial costs of developing, purchas-
ing and deploying this equipment and the security regimes it will sup-
port?37 This query is among the most pressing for port executives and
security officials, politicians, and business leaders.3 8
Evaluating the costs of obtaining security technology equip-
ment for ports only scratches the surface of the overall financial com-
mitment required to implement the CSI around the world. Ports would
not exist without ships coming into them to load and unload materials;
similarly, individual vessels play a vital role in port security.3 9 Ports
31 See, e.g., Natalia Rigol, A Game of Giants: The Future of Sino-U.S. Relations,
HARV. INT'L REV., 2005 at 2, 4, available at 2005 WLNR 5166525.
32 E.g., Hoverter supra note 15, at 364.
33 Id.
34 E.g., Weiner supra note 22, at A6.
35 Ted McKenna, Standing Watch: Maritime nations turn to surveillance technol-
ogy to cope with terrorism, illegal fishing, and more, J. Elec. Def., May 1, 2004 at
3,5,7,9, available at 2004 WLNR 11656615.
36 Id.
37 Symposium, The Red and Green Lights of Homeland Security, 12 U.S.-MEx. L.J.
89, 97-102 (2004).
38 See, e.g., Angela Greiling Keane, Receiving Mixed Signals, TAFFIC WORLD,
Jan. 31, 2005, at 2-4, available at 2004 WLNR 1321310.
39 Id.
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are paid by the shipping companies that unload freight in their facili-
ties, and they will likely pass many security costs along to their cus-
tomers. Higher port fees come at a bad time for shipping concerns that
already face mounting legal, logistical and personnel costs in address-
ing the administrative aspects of security. For example, companies are
now required to perform extensive background checks on all of their
multinational crews, acquire data systems to manage detailed logisti-
cal information and tracking schemes for cargo, and comply with more
intensive customs procedures.4 ° In addition, it is suggested that the
shipping industry move toward replacing its existing shipping contain-
ers with new "smart containers," which are constructed with inte-
grated security sensors to prevent tampering and ease tracking.
Though these new containers cost little more than current models, re-
placing of the entire inventory in circulation, estimated to be as many
411as fifteen million," constitutes a significant expense.42
It should be noted that these security enhancement efforts
have the potential of carrying over to improving the shipping indus-
try's general operations, given the obvious commercial benefits of mod-
ernized processes and increased efficiencies. 43 But in some ways,
these innovations and technologies, and substantial outlays of capital,
are being forced on an industry that is known to operate on thin profit
margins. 44 In light of the highly-publicized federal funding provided
for other sectors like the aviation industry, which will receive approxi-
mately 90% of the Transportation Security Administration's $53 bil-
lion budget in 2005,4 U.S. ports and the American shipping industry
are looking to the federal government for similar financial support.46
The United States Coast Guard has estimated the initial cost
of port security at $1.1 billion,4" and costs for the next ten years some-
where between six and eight billion dollars.4" At this point, much of
this financial burden has been placed on the ports. In February 2004,
40 Id.
41 Michael Richardson, The Coming Sea Change in Port Security, SOUTH CHINA
MORNING POST, Mar. 19, 2004, at 1, available at 2004 WLNR 5988334.
42 TechwebNews, GE Tests 'Wired' Shipping Containers to Combat Terrorism
Threat (January 12, 2005), available at 2005 WLNR 448698.
43 E.g., R.G. Edmonson, What Cost Security?, TRAFFIC WORLD, Sept. 13, 2004, at 1,
available at 2004 WLNR 12111386.
44 Id.
45 James Verini, Two if By Sea, AMERICAN PROSPECT, April 1, 2005, at 2, available
at 2005 WLNR 5166628.
46 Id.
47 Angela Greiling Keane, Maritime's Security Deficit, TRAFFIC WORLD, Apr. 19,
2004, at 2, available at 2004 WLNR 12108095.
48 Symposium, The Red and Green Lights of Homeland Security, supra note 37, at
97.
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President Bush released a budget for 2005 that provided $46 million
for port security, a tenth of what maritime industry lobbying groups,
like the American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA), feels is nec-
essary. 9 The debate over the federal government's financial responsi-
bility for port security bears similarities to the larger debate over the
allocation of Department of Homeland Security funds between the
states. Coastal states where ports are located feel they deserve higher
allocations of federal funding for security, while interior states object
to any inequality in federal security grants to the states. Caught in
the middle are industries like shipping and oil refining. The nature of
these businesses leave them inextricably linked to their coastal geo-
graphical locations. Therefore, they are exposed to the inherent secur-
ity vulnerabilities of these locations' size, demographics, and strategic
value.5 0 Port executives balk at bearing the cost for providing security
that is as crucial to businesses that use ports as it is to the ports them-
selves. In its defense, the federal government touts the efficiency up-
side and potential for higher future profits, and reasons that it is
asking ports and shipping concerns to invest only a small percentage
of the overall costs.5 1
Under the umbrella of the CSI, the U.S. Customs Border Patrol
(CBP) agency formally engaged the international trade community in
preventing terrorist attacks via the Customs-Trade Partnership
Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). The program was initiated in November
2001 and sought to combat terrorist threats by better securing the in-
ternational these improvements certified by CBP. 2 In return, compa-
nies with the certification are less likely to have their cargo containers
inspected.5 3 The program elicited an enthusiastic response from the
transportation services industry; by May 2005 some 9,234 companies
applied to join C-TPAT. However, of that number, only 564 companies
have thus far completed the certification process.5 4 The back-up in
processing applications is due to the stringent validation process, con-
ducted exclusively by CBP personnel. Particularly time-consuming is
49 Keane, Maritime's Security Deficit, supra note 47, at 2.
50 See Id.
51 Symposium, The Red and Green Lights of Homeland Security, supra note 36, at
97.
52 Matthew T. McGrath, Cortney O'Toole Morgan, International Legal Develop-
ments in Review: 2002: Business Regulation, Customs Law, 37 INT'L L. 245, 247
(2002).
53 Port Security Issues Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science
and Transportation, May 17, 2005 (statement of Margaret Wrightson, Director,
United States Government Accountability Office), available at 2005 WLNR
7788931.
54 R.G. Edmonson, C-TPAT Raises COAC Issues, J. OF COMM. ONLINE, May 5,
2005, at 1, available at 2005 WLNR 7463436.
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verifying a company's security measures in multiple foreign locations,
as CBP refuses to use third parties to do so.15 Unless this policy is
reconsidered, the viability of the C-TPAT program depends on the
CBP's ability to expand its certification personnel assets. Given the
demands inherent in the scale and scope of the CBP's operations, par-
ticularly the strain placed on the CBP by the task of securing the U.S-
Mexico border (a burden enhanced by the issue's significant political
components), it seems unlikely these assets will be expanded in the
near term.
The international business community has initiated its own ef-
forts to encourage companies to improve their supply chain security.
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO), based in
Geneva, Switzerland, is an industry group that certifies factories and
other businesses based on quality standards.5 6 ISO's "ISO 9000" certi-
fication has become an "almost universal seal of quality," given its
widespread adoption and record of consistency.5 7 The organization
proposes to add a security component to its standardization package,
similar to the scheme used by C-TPAT. ISO contends that by estab-
lishing one common world standard, countries could not lower their
security standards in an effort to undercut competitors and attract
business, thereby compromising the larger goal of securing all of the
world's ports.5 8
Port security is a challenge that will only be overcome with in-
ternational cooperation. United States leadership is responsible for
many of the global initiatives to improve maritime security. But pro-
jecting the costs of U.S. port security onto the world at large has
strained the resources of small foreign ports. Both the CSI and some of
its subordinate programs have the potential effect of blacklisting for-
eign ports from handling goods bound for the U.S. if those ports don't
meet the standards for port security. One of the greatest challenges in
the continued formulation of U.S. policy will be balancing the conflicts
between providing for national security and assuring smooth opera-
tions and continued growth of global trade.5 9
As the two countries with perhaps the most at stake in the
struggle to attain global maritime security, China and the U.S. find
themselves with increasingly common interests. But relations be-
55 Id. at 2.
56 International Organization for Standardization homepage, at http://
www.iso.org/iso/enfISOOnline.frontpage (last visited on Feb. 19th, 2006).
57 R.G. Edmonson, Crossing the Line?, J. OF COMMERCE, May 9, 2005, at 1 (ex-
plaining that in the international manufacturing community, ISO 9000 certifica-
tion assures businesses that products produced under this banner will consistently
meet expectations for quality), available at 2005 WLNR 7463807.
58 Id.
59 E.g., Weiner supra note 22, at A6.
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tween the countries are hampered by broader foreign policy and geopo-
litical issues. As China's economy grows, so grows its political and
military power. Differences in Chinese and American stances on is-
sues like the war in Iraq and Taiwan are endemic of growing political
tension between the world's singular hyper-power and a rising super-
power.6 °
III. THE LAW BEHIND MARITIME SECURITY INITIATIVES:
RECONCILING AMERICAN POLICY WITH CHINESE AND
MULTILATERAL INITIATIVES
Whereas section II of this paper focused on joint government-
business programs and legislation promulgated by the U.S. in the
wake of the 9/11 attacks, section III will examine maritime law and
policy in China and the international community, and specifically how
it interacts with U.S. law.
A. Maritime Law and the Trade Relationship Between the U.S. and
the People's Republic of China
At the end of the 1990's, maritime relations between the U.S.
and China were governed by a bilateral accord, which expired in
1998.61 Signed in 1988, the Agreement on Maritime Transport Be-
tween the Government of the United States of America and the Gov-
ernment of the People's Republic of China (Agreement on Maritime
Transport) predated China's ascension to membership in the World
Trade Organization.6 2 Though the agreement did facilitate trade be-
tween the U.S. and China during a period of growth, it reflected the
closed nature of the Chinese maritime industry and the disparities in
the opportunities offered by the two governments to the businesses of
the other.6 3 The American shipping industry alleged that the Chinese
government gave preferential treatment to Chinese nationals in mari-
time business matters, and imposed restrictions and limitations that
were not reciprocated by the U.S. on Chinese companies doing busi-
ness in U.S ports.6 4 The Agreement on Maritime Transport expired in
1998, but was extended while a new agreement was drafted. During
60 E.g., Rigol supra note 31, at 4.
61 Agreement on Maritime Transport Between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China, Dec. 15,
1988, U.S.-P.R.C. art. XI, State Dept. No. 89-20, available at 1988 WL 404672.
[hereinafter Agreement on Maritime Transport].
62 Id.
63 See generally Mark S. Hamilton, Negotiating Port Access: The Sino-U.S. Oppor-
tunity for Leadership in the Maritime Transport Services Industry, 3 ASIAN-PAc. L.
& POL'Y J. 153, 167-69 (2002).
64 Id.
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these years, China attempted to further restrict shipping contracts for
goods leaving its ports, causing the U.S. government, via the Federal
Maritime Commission, to threaten sanctions limiting Chinese access
to American ports. 65 A Federal Maritime Commission Report, issued
in June 1999, concluded that, "Chinese laws and regulations discrimi-
nate against and disadvantage U.S. carriers and other non-Chinese
shipping lines."66
But as China moved toward membership in the World Trade
Organization, it began to show significant progress in maritime policy
and opening its ports to the international community. In addition, it
further liberalized its policies on foreign investment in the maritime
services industry within China. By the end of 2001, the People's Re-
public of China had passed laws allowing foreign-owned businesses to
establish equity joint ventures to engage in a number of port and mari-
time services, as well as navigation of Chinese interior waterways.67
As a result, some 140 Chinese ports were opened to vessels under for-
eign flags.6" Foreign-invested shipping enterprises also enjoyed the
benefits of friendly tax policy, sometimes paying less in taxes on reve-
nues generated in China than their Chinese counterparts.6 9
Differences in Chinese and American maritime law are largely
a function of the vastly different histories of the two nations.7 0 While
American maritime law can be traced back to the early 19th century,
the People's Republic of China is itself less than sixty years old, and its
maritime law even younger.7 ' Much of the PRC Maritime Code was
adapted from international maritime treaties and agreements like the
1924 Brussels Convention.72 The international origins of its maritime
policy served China well as it prepared for entry into the WTO, where
it was required to meet WTO standards on port access, foreign invest-
ment and other maritime trade issues.78
65 Id.
66 Federal Maritime Commission, Shipping Restrictions, Requirements and Prac-
tices of the People's Republic of China, Docket No. 98-14, (Apr. 21, 2005), at http://
canberra.usembassy.gov/hyper/WF990625/epf504.htm.
67 See Cheng et al., supra note 8, at 79.
68 Id. at 80.
69 Id. at 82-83.
70 See Donglai Yang, A Comparative Analysis of Maritime Lien Priority Under
United States and Chinese Maritime Law, 23 TuL. MAR. L.J. 465, 471 (2005).
71 Id.
72 Id. at 471.
73 Larry M. Wortzel, Research: Asia and the Pacific: Seeking Reciprocity in Mari-
time Trade with China, The Heritage Foundation Executive Memorandum No.
731, (Mar. 19, 2001), at httpJ/www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/
EM731.cfm.
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Maritime relations between the U.S. and China are currently
governed by a five-year bilateral agreement signed by the two coun-
tries in December 2003.7' The agreement sought to resolve many of
the issues that arose in the years since the expiration of the 1998
agreement, as well as to address the needs of the growth in trade be-
tween China and the U.S. The agreement also opened the door for
American companies to greatly expand their business operations in
China in the logistics and shipping industries.75
Generally speaking, claims related to maritime commerce in
China are litigated in the Chinese civil courts system, which is gov-
erned by the People's Republic of China Civil Procedure Law.76 This
PRC Civil Procedure Law came into effect in 1991, with China's Su-
preme Court designated as its ultimate interpretive authority.77 From
its inception, the Chinese code looked outward. It was instituted with
provisions for handling cases in semi-foreign countries, like Hong
Kong, Taiwan and Macau, and was declared subject to international
treaties entered into by China.78 Chinese courts are structured some-
what like the federal court system in the United States: there are four
levels of courts (District People's Courts, Intermediate People's Courts,
High People's Courts, and the Supreme People's Court), divided among
administrative regions of the country. Within the system, there are
specialized courts to deal with specific areas of law, including a mari-
time court.7 9
The closed nature of the Chinese system and its Communist
rulers made foreign businesses uncomfortable using the People's
Courts in the past. As a result, most dispute resolution was handled by
arbitration."0 The China International Economic and Trade Arbitra-
tion Commission (CIETAC) was established in 1956. Based in Beijing,
with sub-commissions in Shanghai and Shenzen, it is "among one of
the most widely used arbitral bodies in the world.""1 Comparing
CIETAC to other busy international arbitral bodies also reveals the
extent of its growth and popularity: in 1997, CIETAC heard more arbi-
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tration cases than any other arbitration entity in the world.8 2 There
also exists the China Maritime Arbitration Commission (CMAC),
which specializes in sea transport issues and sees substantial traffic as
a result of its proximity to the ports of Hong Kong and Shanghai, the
two busiest in the world.8 3
Decisions rendered in Chinese arbitrations are final and bind-
ing, with no appeal option. China's civil law system lends itself to
faster arbitrations than countries with common law jurisdictions. 4
When polled, U.S.-owned businesses with experience in Chinese arbi-
tration reported that compared to arbitrations in other international
centers, those in China were often less expensive, more efficient, and
had no apparent discrepancies in fairness.8 5 Though arbitration re-
mains the primary means for dispute resolution by foreign entities do-
ing business in China, the escalation in trade has resulted in
increasing numbers of foreigners in Chinese courts.8 6 Greater trans-
parency and confidence in the Chinese court system are symptomatic
of China's entry into the WTO, and the opening of a previously closed
society that it required.
B. The Role of International Law in Maritime Security Issues
In terms of maritime security initiatives, this paper has fo-
cused primarily on unilateral programs created by the United States
in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. Though these programs involve inter-
national cooperation, such efforts have been voluntary, insomuch as
they have been embarked upon out of a mutual interest in maintaining
the flow of global trade. As the U.S. promulgated legislation in an ef-
fort to better protect itself against terrorist attacks, so too have the
organizational bodies of the international community. Shortly after
the 9/11 attacks, the United Nations passed a general resolution stat-
ing that countries bear a responsibility to prevent against terrorist at-
tacks and prosecute terrorists, particularly via bilateral and
multilateral agreements.8 7 In July 2004, the International Port Secur-
ity Security Code (ISPSC) took effect. An amendment to the 1992 Con-
vention for the Supression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
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Transnational Disputes: A Survey of Trends in The People's Republic of China, 15
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Maritime Navigation (the "SUA Convention"),8 8 the ISPSC was passed
to bolster security for global trade via measures to prevent acts of ter-
rorism against ports and ships.8 9 Failure to implement the security
requirements of the ISPS by a deadline put nations at risk of huge
economic losses. 9 0
Though adopted under the auspices of these international or-
ganizations, the net effect of failure to meet the terms of these agree-
ments related to foreign port security often results in penalties being
leveled by the United States government that limit access to U.S.
ports.9 ' As discussed earlier in this article, the primary obstacle in
implementing heightened security measures at ports is cost. While
the U.S. pays for the technological equipment used in scanning cargo,
foreign ports are expected to bear the cost of operating it. 92 Moreover,
some critics of the new security requirements question whether the
United States is overstepping its boundaries in dictating security pol-
icy on foreign soil. 93 And in spite of signed international agreements
on maritime security, questions remain as to the legal obligation sig-
natory countries bear in preventing terrorism, and how this obligation
is quantified.94 Such details are important, because international le-
gal precedent holds that a state can be held responsible for actions or a
failure to act on the part of its authorities. 95
It is unlikely that countries with substantial interests in trade
with the U.S. would jeopardize that trade by refusing to comply with
new security regulations. 96 However, smaller nations unwilling or un-
able to meet new standards could present security risks beyond terror-
ist threats. In describing reaction to the new U.S. maritime security
regimes, Stephen E. Flynn, a retired Coast Guard official and mari-
time expert at the Council on Foreign Relations stated, "The develop-
ing world is saying that the wealthiest, most powerful nation in the
world is exporting the cost of protecting itself onto some of the world's
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poorest countries."9" If a country were to have sanctions leveled
against it preventing its cargo from reaching U.S. ports, the financial
implications could result in political instability in that country. 98
United States intervention on worldwide maritime security
transcends concern with cargo coming into U.S. ports. Various key sea
lanes used by the worldwide shipping industry have also been identi-
fied as potential terrorist targets.9 9 One frequently cited is the Straits
of Malacca, situated between Malaysia and Indonesia in Southeast
Asia."0 ' Fifty thousand vessels pass through those Straits each year,
and carry with them 50 percent of the world's oil and 66 percent of the
world's liquefied natural gas.' The United States has promoted a
regional initiative to enhance maritime security in the straits via intel-
ligence sharing and multi-national coordination of patrols in the area.
The governments of Malaysia and Indonesia, however, view such pro-
posals as an infringing on their national sovereignty, given the fact the
straits are within their territorial waters.10 2 The situation is yet an-
other example of the challenges the United States, China, and other
major economic powers face as they struggle to achieve the global mar-
itime security necessary to guarantee the flow of commerce.'0 3
C. FOOD FOR ADDITIONAL THOUGHT: PRACTICAL
RAMIFICATIONS OF NEW INTERNATIONAL MARITIME
SECURITY REGIMES
This paper has focused on a few major representative issues in
examining the challenges facing the United States, China, and the rest
of the world in the quest for maritime security. But a high-altitude
examination of an issue such as this can belie the almost incalculable
complexity of it. It is hoped that a brief look at a minor practical issue
can demonstrate by example the innumerable conflicts that arise as
the world attempts, multilaterally, to secure its ports, ships and wa-
terways. Such minor issues have the potential to negatively impact
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the level of cooperation offered by both countries and individuals, par-
ticularly toward the United States and its security regimes.
As previously explained, programs like the CSI and C-TPAT
depend on cooperation by both foreign nations and multi-national
businesses. Compliance by businesses requires not just leadership
from company executives, but actual implementation by lower-level
employees. This is particularly true of shipping companies, where
largely autonomous ships' crews are responsible for following direc-
tives from "headquarters."
The notion of the sailor on shore leave is woven into the rich,
centuries-old history of water navigation. Indeed, the tradition of
crews on seagoing merchant vessels being free to go ashore in foreign
ports is as old as seafaring itself, though the right to do so is not abso-
lute. 1 0 4 In spite of the negative connotations of the stereotyped ideal of
the sailor going ashore in search of hedonistic debauchery, after weeks
or months of being confined to a ship at sea, shore leave is crucial to
ships' crew members' health and sanity. Moreover, shore leave is often
the sole opportunity crew members have to purchase necessary goods
and services, communicate with family, and seek advanced health
care. 105
But in the wake of post-9/11 immigration and port security pol-
icies, foreign mariners now find it considerably more difficult, if not
impossible, to go ashore in United States' ports, given its stringent
visa requirements. °6 In a discussion of the complex political, finan-
cial, and logistical facets of maritime security, the notion of a ship
crew's morale could be dismissed as trivial. But when considered in
light of the crucial role ships' crews play in implementing and execut-
ing new security measures, their morale is a minor issue considerably
more difficult to dismiss.
IV. CONCLUSION
The determination and ingenuity of terrorists in the 21st cen-
tury require sophisticated, proactive security regimes to protect
against attacks. Perhaps no potential terrorist target is larger or more
fragmented than the whole of the world's ports, commercial shipping
vessels, and key shipping lanes. This creates an enormously far-flung
and complex problem in securing maritime transport, and the fate of
the world economy rests on its solution. Assuring the free flow of goods
and materials is of vital importance to all nations, but arguably to
none more than the United States and China. The continued growth of
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both countries' economies is contingent not just upon the ability to
safely transport cargo to each other's ports, but confidence in the
global marketplace in their ability to do so.
The United States has, thus far, led the way in passing legisla-
tion and creating programs to enhance maritime security at both its
own ports and those around the world where it trades cargo. Interna-
tional bodies like the United Nations and the International Maritime
Organization have followed suit, but ultimately monetary and access
penalties threatened by the United States that compel countries to
adopt U.S. security regimes.
In the United States, the government loudly proclaims the
need for enhanced maritime security and promulgates legislation re-
quiring it. But the federal government fails to provide ports with fund-
ing equal to that it has appropriated for other transportation
industries, like commercial aviation. The majority of the financial bur-
den for the substantial capital outlays required to equip, staff and ad-
minister security has fallen on the shipping industry. Though this
appears logical in some respects, on the whole it is not. The shipping
industry exists only to serve the businesses for which it moves cargo,
in the end, these security costs must be passed on to those businesses.
Businesses should prepare for increased transportation costs, and ac-
cept them as a price of moving their manufacturing operations abroad.
It is likely that some of the improved technology and logistical
organization inherent in adhering to programs like the Container Se-
curity Initiative will ultimately be of commercial benefit to the mari-
time services industry. But this windfall is speculative. And for it to be
realized, maritime terrorist attacks, and the havoc even a single inci-
dent can wreak on global trade, will have to be completely prevented.
The federal government must find ways to ease the financial burden
on ports and maritime concerns with greater subsidies, or the industry
developing tax or fee schemes to spread the costs among all of those
businesses who require and benefit from this security.
The costs, financial and political, of deploying U.S.-dictated se-
curity policy abroad must also be considered. All nations that partici-
pate in global trade owe some measure of contribution to achieve
maritime security, but those with the highest vested interest should
pay an appropriately scaled share. Though China has been cooperative
in assisting the U.S. in efforts to solve the security crisis, it should
demonstrate greater interest and assume a more significant leader-
ship position in maritime security, in both its own region and the
world. It owes much of its ascendance as a global power to the ability
to ship its manufactured goods around the globe. If China seeks the
influence and power commensurate with its super-power status, it
should be prepared to assume some of the responsibilities that accom-
pany it.
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The level of international cooperation sought by the United
States will be more easily attained if it examines and re-evaluates
some of its own policies. Unilateral action and decision-making on ma-
jor issues that affect the entire world- in an era that calls for an un-
precedented level of multilateralism- will ultimately impede efforts to
build the necessary consensus and marshal sufficient resources.
Achieving maritime security, and assuring the smooth flow of global
trade is plausible only if countries like China and the U.S. capitalize
on their shared strengths, and exploit synergies in securing the world's
oceans and ports.
